While they certainly have doctrine for command, control and planning, with operational and tactical methods Special Forces operatives tend to echo Clausewitz instinctively, arguing that theory is the wise man’s tool and the fool’s master, and that the often significant challenges they face are dealt with more effectively by originality of thought and flexibility of action than codified methodologies.

To compound this, that other staple of academic papers, ‘doctrine’, is difficult to obtain due partially to official secrecy but more likely because codified templates for action are a liability for this type of force. Moreover, Special Forces have no Guru and no ‘Great Theoretician’ to advance their case, as insurgency had with Lawrence, Mao and Che - this normally providing the start point for academic discussion of any form of warfare. This may be due partially to image problems arising from their popularity in sensationalist media and as a subject for popular films and video games. So, the aim of Special Forces is to deliver high precision at lower risks and costs than might otherwise be possible specialists they are, but ‘elite’, not.ĭespite their potential significance for policy makers, Special Forces are largely overlooked by academia. Special Forces are no exception, being military assets designed and trained to conduct tactical actions delivering strategic outcome that is out of proportion with their size and that if conducted by conventional units, may have a disproportionate negative impact on policy. All military units are specialists in their own specific role, requiring personnel of particular aptitudes differing from those required in other units, and specialised organisation, training and equipment.

Special Forces are vital strategic asset performing functions others cannot.

Who Dares Wins by Mr Tony Geraghty